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Abstract
Thirty-eight subjects selected on the basis of extreme 
REP test scores participated in a task requiring them to 
make ratings ot comfort when presented with hypothetical 
persons with differing personality attributes. Attribute 
sets were composed of five bipolar construct dimensions 
determined individually for each subject by extracting 
constructs that were mutually unrelated (differentiated) 
or mutually related (undifferentiated). Subjects rated 
each of 32 different attribute combinations. It .was expect­
ed that the mutually related construct dimensions ot the 
undifferentiated group would increase the likelihood of cue 
inconsistency and result in ratings formed on the basis of 
a nonadditive model of information processing while the 
lack of mutual relationship among the constructs of the 
differentiated group would result in impressions that adhere 
to an additive model. Results indicated that an additive 
model adequately accounted for the ratings of all subjects. 
However, the ratings of the undifferentiated group showed 
significantly greater nonadditive components than did the 
ratings of the differentiated group. This result was 
interpreted to reflect attempts to resolve cue inconsisten­
cies encountered by the undifferentiated group.
Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955) proposes 
that an individual evolves a system of personal constructs 
which serves to predict and interpret the events of his 
life. Man attempts to construe the world around him by 
actively testing the predictive accuracy of his construct 
system while continually revising the system in accord 
with the feedback which is received.
Attempts to systematically measure personal construct 
systems resulted in the development of the Role Construct 
Repertory (REP) Test (Kelly, 1955). The REP test permits 
an investigator to evaluate an individual's construct 
system in light of the significant persons in his life. 
Though the test was specifically designed for use in 
clinical settings, the general technique has provided new 
operational measures for such traditional areas of psycho­
logical interest as identification (Jones, 1961; Salmon, 
1969), threat (Landfield, 195b), transference (Crisp, 1964; 
Sechrest, 1962), stereotyped thinking (Flynn, 19 59), and 
thought disorder (Bannister, 1960, 1962, 1966; Bannister 
& Fransella, 1966). Extended discussions of Personal 
construct Theory and the use of the REP test have been 
furnished by Bannister and Mair (1966), Bannister (1970), 
Bonanus (1965) , and Landfield (1971) .
The kEP test has been extensively used m  the experi­
mental investigation of cognitive complexity. Cognitive 
complexity is a structural concept introduced and developed
2by Bieri and m s  associates (Bieri, 19bb, 1961; Bieri, 
A t k m s , Briar, Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi, 1966; Tripodi 
& Bieri, 1963) to reflect the amount of differentiation 
in a person's interpersonal construct system. An indi­
vidual who employs numerous, well differentiated con­
structs to construe and represent his interpersonal 
environment is thought to be cognitively complex; an in­
dividual who utilizes fewer constructs with little dis- 
cnminability among them is considered to have a simple 
cognitive structure. Initial investigations (Bieri, 1955, 
1961) indicated that individuals high in complexity main­
tain an orthogonal set of personal constructs, resulting 
in REP test scores which reflect the relative lack of any 
systematic relationship among the constructs in the system. 
Individuals low in complexity maintain less differentiated 
constructs, producing REP test scores which reflect con­
siderable systematic relationship among the constructs in 
the system.
As an explanatory concept, cognitive complexity "is 
intended to indicate something about the person's struc­
turing of his social world" (Bieri et al., 1966; p. 185). 
The generality of cognitive complexity has been empirically 
limited to the domain of interpersonal events and judg­
ments; evidence demonstrates essentially no correlation 
between cognitive complexity and general measures of 
intelligence (Crockett, 1965).
Bieri has operationally restricted cognitive com­
plexity to the number of differentiated constructs and 
the degree of articulation within the construct dimensions 
composing a cognitive system. Articulation is intended 
to reflect the number of intervals an individual is able 
to represent on a construct dimension. Crockett (1965), 
however, has argued that differentiation represents only 
one aspect of cognitive complexity. A complete explana­
tion of complexity requires an understanding of the hierar 
chical integration of differentiated constructs. Crockett 
aligns his position with Werner's (1957) developmental 
view which characterizes growth as the progressive differ­
entiation and articulation of a child's global, diffuse, 
and limited construct system into a hierarchically 
organized system of superordinate and subordinate concepts 
In agreement with this position, the present study will 
use the term differentiation instead of complexity as the 
more precise identification of what is actually measured.
Kelly (1955) maintained that construct organization 
provides an individual with paths of inference and the 
potential means of resolving bits of otherwise contra­
dictory information. An individual organizes his con­
structs , either by assigning priorities to those which 
will take precedence when contradictions arise (super- 
ordinate constructs), or by arranging inferential re­
lationships among the constructs in the system. The
4functional importance of an organized construct system 
rests on the assumption that without such organization, 
confusion and chaos would inevitably ensue. In this 
regard, Bannister (1960, 1962) reported that schizo­
phrenics evidence a high degree ot differentiation be­
tween their constructs but that their judgments tend to 
be unstable and inconsistent over time. These data led 
Adams-Webber (1970a) to conclude that 
it seems to follow that it cannot be differentiation 
alone which determines the level of functioning of a 
construct system but rather the progressive differentia­
tion and reintegration of substructures at increasingly 
higher levels of abstraction Ip. 37].
Although Kelly's approach recognizes that the indi­
vidual engages in some form of hierarchical construct 
organization for his convenience m  processing information, 
the specific nature of the organizational activity is 
unclear. Does the efficiency gained from construct 
organization result primarily from the stable, structural 
properties of the construct system? That is, do certain 
"a priori" construct relationships serve to organize the 
perception of events in the most efficient manner? Or is 
the formation of impressions and judgments more efficient 
when based on a construct system characterized by a high 
degree of independence among the constructs? The latter 
position implies that hierarchical construct organization
5(the integration of a series of differentiated constructs) 
is defined as a structural outcome of a specific event 
rather than as a structural "given" within a construct 
system. This suggests that it is the flexibility of the 
construct system, and not the a priori organization of 
constructs which facilitates perceptual clarity and 
efficient performance.
Streufert and Fromkin (1972) note that while various 
approaches to cognitive complexity accept differentiation
t
as a precondition for integration, integration is not 
consistently invoked as an important element in cognitive 
complexity research. This inconsistent emphasis is under­
standable in light of the fact that the KEP test was not 
designed to directly assess hierarchical construct organ­
ization. The REP test does, however, provide an element of 
organizational information m  the form of construct 
clustering (Landfield, 1971). Assuming that highly related 
construct clusters represent a kind of predetermined or 
invariant structural organization, one can then ask what 
effect such structural organization has on the efficiency 
of information processing. If a fixed, structural organi­
zation contributes to the efficiency and clarity of judg­
ment, then individuals exhibiting greater construct inter­
relatedness (low cognitive differentiation) should be the 
most efficient and accurate processors of information. If, 
on the other hand,, a priori construct relationships pre-
6elude the potential recombination of constructs, then 
individuals possessing a highly differentiated construct 
system should render more accurate judgments.
In general, empirical evidence indicates that as the 
systematic relationships among constructs increase, 
judgmental accuracy declines. Bieri (1955) reported that 
cognitive complexity was related to the accurate perception 
ot differences between an individual and a second person 
(r=.35), but was not related to the accurate perception of 
similarities (r=.02). The inaccurate or unwarranted 
perception of similarities was inversely related to cogni­
tive complexity (r= -.40). Additional studies have dem­
onstrated that high cognitive differentiation is related 
to the accurate prediction of another person's constructs 
(Adams-Webber, 19 69), low scores on assimilative projection 
(Leventhal, 1957), more global and more confident impres­
sions in the resolution of inconsistent information (Mayo & 
Crockett, 1964), clarity of impressions based on initial 
and additional information (Leventhal & Singer, 1964), 
efficiency of judging multidimensional stimuli (Tripodi & 
Bieri, 1964), the preference for moderate probability 
values (Higgins, 1961), and the perception of greater 
situational conflict (Tripodi & Bieri, 1966). It may be 
concluded that to the extent that an individual's constructs 
are relatively independent of each other, i.e., constructs 
are organized vis-a-vis a given judgmental situation,
/judgmental accuracy increases and perceptual clarity is 
facilitated.
If differing cognitive structures (defined in terms 
of construct relatedness) influence the accuracy of inter­
personal judgments, then it can be suggested that the 
nature of the judgmental process itself should vary as a 
function of cognitive structure. Specifically, highly 
differentiated individuals should process constructs which 
are representative of their system in a fashion character­
istically different from undifferentiated individuals.
An indication of the differing judgmental processes of 
differentiated and undifferentiated individuals can be 
found in a study by Slovic (1966). Slovic demonstrated 
that judges weight cues differentially according to the 
consistency of the relationship among the cues. When two 
cues which were believed to be highly correlated were 
consistent (both present or both absent), they were weighted 
heavily in the judgment task. On the other hand, when two 
cues believed to be correlated were presented in a logically 
inconsistent manner (one present and one absent), judges 
either ignored one of the cues or utilized other cues to a 
greater extent than was the case when no discrepancy 
existed.
On the basis of Slovic*s results, if the construct 
dimensions of the highly differentiated individuals are 
truelv unrelated (e.g., a happy person does not necessarily
bimply a friendly person), then the presence of one construct 
pole (happy) in combination with another pole (unfriendly) 
would not represent an inconsistent relationship. When 
presented with a number of sets of independent constructs, 
the weights of the constructs should be stable across 
varying combinations of the constructs, resulting in judg­
ments that closely adhere to a linear (additive) model.
This is consistent with Anderson’s (1971) conclusion that 
judgmental ratings will fit a strictly additive model when 
informational stimuli are completely independent in their 
action.
Converselv, if the constructs used by the undiffer­
entiated individuals are truely related, then the consistency 
of input cues becomes very important; the weight asso­
ciated with a particular cue will necessarily depend on the 
presence and absence of the remaining cues (Anderson, 1971). 
Following Slovic (1966), if two construct dimensions are 
related and inconsistent poles of these dimensions are 
presented (e.g., friendly and unhappy), the individual low 
in differentiation may ignore one of these cues or utilize 
other available constructs to a greater extent than when 
no discrepancy is present. According to Wiggins (1973)
"such differential cue utilization is clearly nonlinear in 
nature" Lp. 178J. Thus, if the undifferentiated individual 
is presented with periodic inconsistencies among sets of 
related construct dimensions, he should depart from a
ystrictly additive model and employ combination rules ot a 
configural (nonlinear) nature.
The procedure utilized in the present study presented 
differentiated and undifferentiated subjects with a set of 
five bipolar construct dimensions taken directly from each 
of their REP tests. A complete factorial arrangement of 
the construct poles were presented, resulting in 32 con­
figurations for each subject. Subjects were asked to in­
dicate the degree of comfort they would feel if it were 
necessary for them to spend some time with a person possess­
ing the attributes indicated m  each presentation. These 
ratings were analyzed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
model employed by a number of investigators (e.g., Anderson, 
1969, 1971, 1972; Birnbaum, 1974; Hoffman, Slovic &
Rorer, 1968; Milliment & Greenberg, 197 3) to detect the 
presence of linearity and configurality in the judgment 
process. In the ANOVA model, a significant main effect for 
a cue implies that judgments varied systematically as a 
function of that cue. Alternatively, a significant inter­
action effect indicates that the judgment was made on the 
basis of two or more cues in combination, i.e., judgmental 
variation for one cue is a function of the level of at 
least one other cue.
Using ANOVA terminology, the predictions for the present 
study can be stated as follows; (1) Persons possessing a 
highly differentiated-construct system form impressions
characterized by the simple additive effects of all inter­
personal constructs, as evidenced by the predominance of 
significant main effects in the ANOVA of their judgments.
(2) Persons possessing a highly undifferentiated construct 
system form impressions characterized by a configural 
orientation to the relevant interpersonal constructs, as 
evidenced by the predominance of significant interaction 
effects in the ANOVA of their judgments.
It is recognized that main and interaction effects 
may prove statistically significant yet still not account 
for a large part of the total variance of a judge's ratings. 
An omega-square (w ; Kirk, 1968), computed for each signi­
ficant main effect and interaction, provides an estimate 
of the proportion of judgmental variance accounted for by 
each effect. Consistent with the previous predictions, 
it was expected that (3) the variance accounted for by 
significant main effects is greater for persons possessing 
a highly differentiated construct system while the variance
accounted for by significant interaction effects is greater
%




One-nundred ninty-six students enrolled in an intro­
ductory psychology course at the University of Nebraska at 
Omaha were administered a modification of Bien's (Tripodi &
Bieri, 196 3) REP test. Because of the small number of 
males enrolled in the participating classes (N=46), only 
female subjects were considered (N=150). From this 
population (REP test score X=821, SD=22U), the 2U highest 
scorers (with scores at least +1 SD above the mean) and 
the 20 lowest scorers (with scores at least -1 SD below 
the mean) were selected for further investigation. These 
subjects were contacted by telephone and asked to partici­
pate in an experimental task requiring 30 minutes of their 
time. Because one of the low differentiation subjects 
declined to participate in the experiment, the high differ­
entiation scorer who evidenced the lowest differentiation 
score was dropped in order to maintain equal group size 
(N=19).
Materials
Initially, Bieri's (19bb) REP test procedure required 
a respondent to list 12 important persons in his life. The 
respondent was asked to consider three of these persons at 
a time and to indicate how two are similar and one is dif­
ferent for a particular construct of his choosing. This 
same construct was then used in judging each of the remain­
ing persons on the list. In this manner, a total of 12 
constructs were generated and applied to all 12 persons on 
the respondent's list, A measure of cognitive complexity 
was obtained by considering the similarity of each construct 
row to every other construct row in the matrix. If the
12
rows had similar patterns of ratings for all persons, 
regardless of the construct labels, the constructs were 
presumed to be functionally equivalent and were associated 
with low cognitive complexity. High cognitive complexity 
was associated with a highly dissimilar pattern of ratings 
across persons.
To facilitate measurement operations, Tripodi ana 
Bieri (iye>3) developed a modified version of the REP test. 
Instead of requiring a respondent to generate his own set 
ot persons and constructs, a set ot 1U role categories 
(e.g., "person you dislike") and 10 bipolar constructs 
(e.g., "outgomg-shy") are provided to him. After deciding 
upon 10 persons who best correspond to the role categories, 
ratings are made using a Likert-type scale ranging from 
-3 to +3 (excluding a zero value) for each of the 10 
persons on each of the 1U construct dimensions. Each rating 
m  a row is compared with each rating directly below it 
(for the same person) yielding a measure of agreement.
This procedure is performed for all possible comparisons 
within the same role category, and added together.1
Although Bieri's modification ot the REP test has 
received considerable acceptance, it appears that his 
scoring system has several faults. The major fault of 
Bieri's system is that in scoring one role category at a 
time, it is impossible to evaluate the presence of a 
systematic relationship among the construct dimensions.
13
For example, that an individual views his mother as happy 
and friendly does not constitute sufficient evidence to 
conclude that he views all (or even most) happy people as 
friendly. To effectively measure construct differentiation, 
it is necessary to compare the happy-sad dimension and the 
friendly-unfriendly dimension across all role categories. 
Secondly, Bieri's system .requires that a rating of +3 
(very happy) and -3 (very unfriendly) be scored to indicate 
differentiation (by virtue of the signs being different).
If the two values were both -3 or both +3, they would be 
scored to indicate an undifferentiated relationship be­
tween the two construct dimensions. It should be clear, 
however, that these two examples should receive the same 
score as the sign of the rating is a false distinction and 
originates merely as a function of the arbitrary assign­
ment of the construct dimension to the positive and negative 
poles of the rating scale. The present study used a scoring 
system devised by Millimet (1974, see Appendix A) which 
proposed to correct the deficiencies inherent in Bieri's 
scoring system.
In the present administration of the REP test, subjects 
were required to fill each of 10 specified role categories 
with one person from his social environment. From a pro­
vided list of 60 bipolar interpersonal construct dimensions, 
15 were chosen by the subject as personally important to 
him. The 15 construct dimensions were then used to rate
each of the 10 persons. The rating scale for each construct 
dimension ranged from +3 to -3, including a zero point, and 
was intended to reflect a subject's judgment of where the 
person being rated was seen on each of the construct dimen­
sions (e.g., more tense or more relaxed). The ratings 
were scored for cognitive differentiation. A high total 
score indicates that many of the iUb construct dimension 
comparisons (15 constructs taken two at a time) evidence 
some systematic relationship across persons and are thus 
not differentiated from each other in the subject's current 
usage. A low total score indicates that the subject's 
construct dimensions are well differentiated, and do not 
appear to be related across people. For this version of 
the REP test, all negative values of the rating scale were 
aligned with the construct pole which intuitively appeared 
to be the least socially desirable pole.
Test-retest reliabilities for the REP test technique 
have measured by various methods. Fjeld and Landfield 
(1961), using normal subjects, reported the production of 
similar constructs following a two week test-retest inter­
val tor subjects given the same element categories (r=./9) 
and for subjects given entirely new elements to evaluate 
(r=.yu). On the basis ot total complexity scores, Tripodi 
and Bieri (1963) reported high test-retest reliabilities 
using provided constructs (r=.86) and generated constructs 
(r=.76). In the present study, a correlation coefficient
15
of .89 (N=38) was found following a five week test-retest 
interval.
Procedure
Upon entering the testing situation, each subject was 
given a 6 4 page booiclet and a set of instructions. Each 
page of the booklet contained the same five, bipolar con­
struct dimensions which were taken directly from the sub­
ject's REP test. The particular five construct dimensions 
were selected because they best characterized the subject's 
differentiation level. That is, for subjects with low REP 
test scores, the five most mutually differentiated con­
structs were presented in the experimental task (X=2.76). 
for subjects with high REP test scores, the five constructs 
which evidenced the least differentiation among each other 
were considered (X=19.74).
The set of five bipolar constructs was presented to 
each subject 32 times. Each presentation was associated 
with a different combination of the construct poles, con­
sistent with a completely crossed ( 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 )  fac­
torial design. The five construct dimensions were presented 
in the same first to last order on each page with the 
placement of the positive and negative poles determined by 
the fully crossed methodology. The order of presentation 
for the 32 configurations was randomly determined for each 
subject. Each subject was required to respond to the 32 
configurations a second time (in a different random order
16
of presentation) in order to determine mtrajudge test- 
retest reliability and to establish an error term for the 
analysis of variance. For each configuration, the subject 
was given the following intructions. "Please assume that 
you are attending a social function and have just been 
introduced to a person whom you have never met. In the
course of the conversation, it becomes clear to you that
the person possesses those attributes which are circled 
below. After you have carefully considered all the attri- 
butes this person possesses, please indicate on a ten point 
scale how comfortable you would feel in the presence of 
this person if it were necessary for tne two of you to 
spend a considerable amount of time together.4*
Katings were made on a scale which ranged from i 
(extremely uncomfortable) to 1U (extremely comfortable).
The task took from 15 to 30 minutes. Subjects were run m
groups ot one to six and testing was completed over a two
to three week period.
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 presents REP test scores, frequencies ot 
significant main and interaction effects, omega-square 
values, correlation ratios, correlation coefficients, and 
mtrajudge test-retest reliabilities tor the differentiated 
and undifferentiated subjects. Mean test-retest reliabili­
ties for the low (.82) and high (.70) differentiation groups 
were adequate and not significantly different (z=.83, p=.41).
The grand means of the 64 ratings ot the low (X=5.06) and 
high ,(X=5.40) groups were not significantly different 
(t=1.32, df=36, p=.20), indicating that the average rating 
of comfortableness given to the stimulus configurations 
were similar for both groups. That is, the proneness to 
assign favorable ratings did not differ for the two groups.
Insert Table 1 about nere
A separate ANOVA performed on the 64 ratings of each 
subject resulted m  F tests for five main effects (repre­
senting the individual construct dimensions) and 2b inter­
action effects (representing two or more construct dimen­
sions m  combination). it had been predicted that the 
number and kind of significant effects would vary as a 
function of the level of cognitive differentiation, i.e., 
the frequency of statistically significant m a m  effects 
would be greater for the differentiated group, while the 
number of significant interaction effects was expected to 
be greater for the undifferentiated group. A 2 (low and 
high differentiation groups) x 2 (main and interaction 
effects) repeated measures factorial ANOVA performed on 
the frequencies of significant m a m  and interaction effects 
obtained from the ANOVA table of each subject did not 
support the predicted interaction between groups and 
effects (F<1). The main effect for effects was highly 
significant (F=19.58, df=l/36, £<.0001), indicating that
10
most of the variation m  a subject's ratings could be 
accounted for by main effects (X=4.37) rather than inter­
action effects (X=2. 66). It must be recognized, however, 
that this comparison is biased m  favor ot interaction 
effects because of the greater possibility of tneir 
occurrence (26 to b). Therefore, this effect must be con­
sidered to be an underestimate. Subsequently, an ANOVA 
done on the proportion of significant main and interaction 
effects associated with each subject’s ratings resulted m  
a considerably greater effect (F=01b.yy, dt=l/36, £<.00001). 
This result strongly demonstrates the linear component 
in the judgments ot ail subjects; the five constructs 
presented m  each configuration were evaluated independently 
of the constructs with which they were combined.
While the number ot significant main effects associated 
with the undifferentiated (X=4.66) and differentiated 
(X=4.05) groups did not differ (F=1.24, df=1/3b., NS), the 
number of interaction effects associated with the undiffer­
entiated group (X=3.21) was significantly greater than the 
number associated with the differentiated group (X=2.00?
F=4.5b, df=1/3b, £<.05). These effects maKe it clear that 
the significant m a m  effect ot groups (F=5.00, dt=l/3b, 
p=.03) was due primarily to the greater number of signifi­
cant interaction effects associated with the undifferen­
tiated group.
A 2 (low and high differentiation groups) x 2 (mam
ly
and interaction effects) repeated measures factorial ANOVA 
was performed on the omega-square values which were com­
puted for each of the significant effects obtained in the 
individual a n o v a s . As before, it had been predicted that 
the variance accounted for by the significant m a m  effects 
would be greater for the highly differentiated subjects, 
while the variance accounted tor by the significant inter­
action effects would be greater for the undifferentiated 
subjects. The predicted interaction was not supported 
(F=i.86, df=l/Jb, NS). This analysis affirmed the previous 
analysis, indicating that the major portion of the total 
judgmental variance for both groups was accounted for by 
the significant main effects (F=bb9.90, df=l/36, p<.UOUi). 
However, the ANOVA for omega-square values revealed no 
group effect IF=2.33, df-1/36, NS) and despite the greater 
number of interaction effects found for the undifferentiated 
group, this effect was not mirrored in the analysis of the 
omega-square values (F<1). Taken together, these results 
indicate that while the undifferentiated group exhibited 
a greater number of significant interaction effects than 
did the differentiated group, the total judgmental variance 
of both groups was accounted for primarily by the main 
effects of each subject*s ratings.
Although these results support previous findings which 
demonstrate that judgmental processes can be adequately 
accounted for by linear models (Dawes & Corrigan, 19 74?
Goldberg, 1968; Hoffman, Slovic & Rorer, 1968; Millimet 
& Greenberg, 19 73), attention has recently been given to 
the possibility that the predictive success of linear 
models may be due to certain measurement characteristics 
common to most experimental investigations rather than to 
the accurate reflection of the general nature of human 
judgmental processes. Accoring to Dawes and Corrigan 
(19/4)
Linear models work because the situations in which they 
have been investigated are those m  which; (a) the pre­
dictor variables have conditionally monotone relationships 
to criteria (or may easily be rescaled to have such a 
relationship) ; (r>) there is error in the dependent vari­
able; (c) there is error m  the independent variable; 
and (d) deviations from optimal weighting do not make much 
practical difference Ip. lObJ.
While it is not necessary to detail all of these points, 
tne issue concerning conditional monotone relationships is 
relevant to the present study, and merits some elaboration.
A conditional monotone relationship exists it higher 
values of each variable predict higher values on the 
criterion, independently of the values of the remaining 
variables. This condition
is the combination of two more fundamental measurement 
conditions: (a) independence (the ordinal relationship
between each variable and the criterion is independent of
2 1
the values of the remaining variables) and (b) monotonicity 
(the ordinal relationship is one that is monotone) (Dawes 
& Corrigan, ly/4, p. y«).
It is likely that the independent variables (construct 
dimensions) considered in the present study maintained a 
monotonic relationship to the dependent variable (ratings 
of comfortableness). In general, an individual would 
presumably feel more comfortable with a trusting, friendly 
person than with a suspicious, unfriendly person; the more 
positive constructs which are present, the more comfortable 
would be the rating. Because of the strong positive and 
negative social values inherent in the bipolarity of each 
construct dimension, a monotonic relationship undoubtedly 
existed between the independent and dependent variable, 
thus establishing one of the conditions contributing to 
the present success of the linear model. Furthermore, 
there appears to be no theoretical reason to assume that 
the condition of mOnotonicity differed for the two experi­
mental groups. In light of this, and recognizing the 
pervasive effect of social desirability on favorability 
ratings, it would have been more reasonable to expect no . 
differences between the number of significant main effects 
obtained from the ratings of both groups.
Theory does suggest, however, that the condition of 
independence varies as a function of differentiation level. 
Cue independence can be assumed tor the differentiated
group's construct dimensions because of the empirically 
determined lack of mutual relationships among them. On 
the other hand, the degree of mutual relationships evident 
among the construct dimensions of the undifferentiated 
group resulted in a failure to meet the condition of 
independence. The lack of cue independence contributed to 
the greater number of interactions, i.e., greater con- 
figurality, observed in the judgmental processes of this 
group, relative to the differentiated group.
The results of the ANOVA for the frequency of signi­
ficant effects indicate that individual differences may 
exist in the strategies used to combine information. 
Specifically, while a linear model best accounts for the 
responses of people in general, persons who maintain 
undifferentiated construct systems evidence a significant 
nonadditive component in their judgmental processes when 
inconsistent information is presented. Alternatively, 
differentiated individuals adhere to a linear model of 
information processing primarily because inconsistency is 
a less likely occurrence.
The theoretical position of the present study suggests 
that the degree of inconsistent information present in the 
stimulus configurations may be a psychological factor 
contributing to the greater nonadditivity present in the 
undifferentiated subject's ratings. The completely crossed 
factorial design used to generate cue configurations re­
suited in all possible construct combinations. This pro­
cedure increased the likelihood of exposure to both evalu­
ative and logical inconsistencies in at least some of the 
cue configurations, particularly when the stimulus cues 
were mutually related. It is practically impossible to 
determine which cue configurations represented inconsistent 
information for any one individual since the kind of re­
lationship existing among the constituent cues may have a 
meaningfulness and system of logic which is unique to the 
individual who maintains them. Furthermore, this pattern 
of logic and meaning may not be generalizable to any other 
individual; constructs which are related m  the cognitive 
structure of one individual may be functionally independent 
for another.
The manner in which individuals resolve inconsistencies 
particularly m  personality impression formation tasks is 
unclear. According to Anderson (1971) "if the informational 
stimuli are inconsistent, changes either in their meaning 
or their importance could reduce the inconsistency" Ip. 199J 
Changes m  meaning are presumably reflected m  scale value 
changes while changes in importance are mirrored as changes 
in the weight attributed to each stimulus component. some 
evidence indicates that a process of discounting operates 
to reduce the weight placed on some of the cues (e.g., An­
derson & Jacobson, 19 6b; Slovic, 19bb) or that differen­
tial weighting may be associated with cues tnat are least
desirable (Birnbaum, 19/4). An undifferentiated individual 
who maintains a construct system which includes, tor 
example, construct relationships implying that trusting 
people are also friendly and interested-m-others would 
be confronted with an inconsistency.when faced with a 
trusting, friendly, but self-centered person. Theory 
suggests that undifferentiated individuals are confronted 
with this kind of inconsistency more frequently than those 
individuals who maintain differentiated construct systems. 
To resolve such an inconsistency, trusting, friendly, or 
self-centered might be discounted or self-centered may be 
differentially weighted. Alternatively, if discounting 
does not occur, decreases in scale values may result, i.e., 
the meaning of the component cues may be altered.
The combining of component cues appears somewhat 
simpler for the differentiated individual. Presuming that 
the constructs of trusting, friendly, and interested-m- 
others evidence no predetermined relationship for this 
person, then the conjunction of the three (regardless of 
which poles are present) need pose no real problem of 
consistency. The rating for the conjunction would be a 
simple additive function of the three stimulus scale values
If the significantly greater number of interactions 
observed tor the undifferentiated group can be taken as a 
reflection of differential stimulus cue weighting and/or 
changes m  stimulus cue importance as a function of context
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then it may have been that the undifferentiated group 
experienced more inconsistency than did the difterentiated 
group. Attempts to resolve the inconsistencies resulted 
in the observed nonadditive judgmental components.
It has been noted that an additive model can adequately 
account for the subject's ratings in general. To assess 
whether the additive function differed for the two groups 
(i.e., a curved or straight line function), a test of 
departure from linearity was computed for each subject's 
ratings (McNemare, iy6y). Recognizing that the marginal 
means associated with each main effect serve as the best 
estimate of the scale values of the construct dimensions 
(Anderson, iy/U, 1971, 1972), the square of the Pearson Pro­
duct moment correlation of the scale values (averaged for 
each configuration of constructs) and the criterion ratings 
provides an estimate of the amount of linear variation 
accounted for in a judge's responses. This quantity is 
subtracted from the square of the correlation ratio (an 
estimate of the total judgmental variation, linear and 
nonlinear, accounted tor m  a judge's responses), yielding 
an index of the departure from linearity. It was expected 
that the mutuality of relationships among the construct 
dimensions of the undifferentiated group would eventuate 
in qreater departure from linearity in their ratings- The 
3b analyses resulted in three significant (p<.05) depar­
tures from linearity in the high differentiated group and
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nine (p<.05) in the low differentiated group. Tnese values 
were treated as proportions and a test of significance for 
uncorrelated proportions resulted m  a statistically signi­
ficant difference (z=2.uy, £<.U3). This difference was 
also reflected m  the combined data tor the two groups.
The test tor departure from linearity was significant tor 
the undifferentiated group (F=l.yb, df=22/32, £<.U4) and 
nonsignificant tor the differentiated group (F=1.3/, 
df=22/32, p=.2uj. Thus, the ratings of the differentiated 
group appear to adhere to a linear, additive function while 
the ratings of the undifferentiated subjects, as a group, 
evidenced significant departure from a straight line 
function.
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NOTES
^The procedural differences between B i e n  (1955) and 
Tripodi and Bieri (19 63) raise an important methodological 
issue, i.e., the use of elicited versus provided construct 
dimensions. It can be argued that a set of provided con­
structs may not be consistent with the individual's per­
sonal construct system, thereby reducing the reliability 
and validity of his interpersonal judgments. That is, to 
the extent that provided constructs are not representative 
ot the individual's personal construct system is the extent 
to which the resulting complexity score is rendered mean­
ingless. However, Kieferle and Sechrest (1961) and Tripodi 
and Bieri (19 6 3) have shown that an individual's use of 
provided constructs is functionally equivalent to the way 
in which he would use elicited constructs. Jaspars (1964) 
furnished further justification for the use of provided 
constructs when the subject population is comprised of 
"normal" individuals. Nevertheless, the present study 
utilized a compromise procedure in which a list ot 60 con­
structs were provided from which the respondent was asked 
to select 15 construct dimensions which she frequently used 
in describing and thinking about the people in her inter­
personal environment.
^Bieri's scoring system yields a measure of the differenti­
ation among persons (columns) in an individual’s social 
environment. While Millimet's system assesses the degree
J4
ot differentiation among constructs (rows), a correlation 
coefficient of .67 (N=101) was obtained between the two 
systems. Concerning the relationship between the columns 
and rows ot the REP test, Adams-webber (197Ob) has report­
ed correlation coefficients of .89 and .99 using two diff­
erent scoring techniques. It appears that the row and 
column structural indices are functionally equivalent.
The somewhat lower correlation between the Bieri and 
Millimet systems may be accounted tor by the different 
mathmaticai operations used to derive the scores.
TABLE 1
REP Test Scores, Frequencies and 
Omega-Square Values (0)2) of Significant 
Effects, Correlation Ratios (n^)t Correlation 
Coefficients (r^), and Intrajudge Test-Retest Re­






M I M I
457 4 2 .75 .22 .87 .76 .78
486** 4 1 . 84 .01 .93 .43 .35
486 3 1 .82 .02 .91 .83 .82
514** 5 5 .63 .21 .89 .67 .78
515 5 3 .74 .06 .90 .75 .79
518 5 1 .83 .02 .91 .84 .83
543 4 5 .67 .10 .88 .70 .76
546** 4 4 .66 .14 .89 .58 .78
554 5 1 .73 .02 .87 .76 .77
568 5 2 .76 .03 .89 .78 .87
570 4 2 .48 .06 .76 .53 .56
577 3 3 . 71 . 0 5 .89 .74 .80
587 3 0 .58 .00 . 7 7 .62 .54
588 3 0 .44 .00 .76 .51 .48
589 4 3 .79 .04 .91 .80 .84
597 3 1 .48 .04 .69 .53 .48
599 4 2 .39 .07 .71 .42 .43
602 5 0 .89 .00 .94 .87 .85
607 4 2 .77 .05 .91 .79 .84
X 4.05 2.00 .68 .06 .85 .68 .70
**d < 05 F" ' — Departure from Linearity
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TABLE 1 (Cont.)
REP Test Scores, Frequencies and 
Omega-Square Values (u)2) of Significant 
Effects, Correlation Ratios (n2), Correlation 
Coefficients (r2), and Intrajudge Test-Retest Re­





n 2 r2 rtt
M I M I
1081** 5 11 .70 .18 .94 .71 .87
1091 5 3 .85 .03 .94 .86 .89
1115* 4 5 .60 .12 .86 .62 .81
1116** 4 3 .76 .08 .92 .78 .84
1119 5 0 .78 .00 .86 .81 .75
1134 4 0 .45 .00 .69 .51 .45
1152** 5 5 .87 .04 .96 .83 .92
1159 4 4 .75 .05 .91 .78 .83
1191 5 0 .76 .00 .86 .81 .87
1193** 5 2 .81 .03 .92 .63 . 86
1213 5 1 .81 .01 .90 .83 .82
1244** 3 7 .45 .27 .84 .47 .72
1262 5 2 .76 .04 .89 .78 .78
1269 5 0 .75 . 00 .87 .78 .76
1298* 5 4 .87 .04 .95 .87 .91
1398** 5 2 .83 .05 .94 . 81 .88
1404** 5 6 .82 .05 .94 .66 .89
144/** 5 6 .84 .06 .95 .00 .90
1793** 5 0 .75 .00 .87 .63 .83
X 4.68 3.21 .75 . 06 .90 .69 . 82
**p<.05, F
— — Departure from Linearity
*p<.08, f
"* ~ Departure from Linearity
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Appendix A
A MODIFICATION OF GEORGE KELLY"S ROLE CONSTRUCT 
REPERTORY (REP) TEST FOR MEASURING COGNITIVE DIFFERENTIATION
C. Raymond Millimet 
University of Nebraska at Omaha *
Test Administration
The respondent is asked to complete a 10 x 15 matrix 
where the 10 columns represent role categories (e.g., 
mother, person you dislike) and the 15 rows represent 
construct dimensions. The construct dimensions are selected 
by the respondent from a list of 60 bipolar constructs pro­
vided by the experimenter (e.g., honest-dishonest, shy- 
outgoing) .
The respondent is asked to select a person from his 
environment who corresponds to each of the 10 role cate­
gories. The name or initials of each person is written in 
the space provided above the appropriate column. Each 
name must represent a real person and may not be used more 
than once.
The respondent is asked to consider each construct 
dimension, one at a time, and provide a rating for each of 
the 10 persons he has selected, using a rating scale from 
-3 to +3 (including zero).
Scoring
The amount of differentiation between any two construct 
dimensions is determined by subtracting algebraicallv the
rating for one construct, for a given role category, from 
the rating of another construct dimension, for the same 
role category. This procedure is repeated for each of the 
remaining role categories resulting in 10 separate values. 
The sign of each value is not considered thereafter.^
Each of the 10 values is compared to every other 
value. One point is scored for every equivalent pair of 
values among the 45 possible pairings (10 values taken two 
at a time). This results in a differentiation score rang­
ing from 3 to 4 5 for the two construct dimensions under
consideration. The smaller the score, the greater the
2differentiation among the 2 construct dimensions.
This procedure is performed for each of the 105 pair­
ings of the 15 construct dimensions. The total score can 
range from 0 to 4410. The smaller the total score, the 
greater the differentiation among the 15 construct dimen­
sions .
^Because of the arbitrary assignment of the poles of a 
construct dimension to the positive and negative poles of 
the rating scale, the resulting signs of the difference 
scores are irrelevant for determining the differentiation 
score between the two construct dimensions under considera­
tion.
2By virtue of using a rating scale which ranges from -3 to 
+3, the maximum number of different values that can be ob­
tained by the'subtraction procedure is seven (6, 5, 4, 3,
2, 1, 0). Therefore, some set of three values must be re­
peated, leading to a minimum differentiation score of three. 
In order to eliminate this artifact, a score of three is 
subtracted from the initial differentiation score, re­




Consider the following two construct dimensions and 
the ratings made from them to the role categories.
Role Categories 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1U
+1 -3 0 + 2 -1 -1 0 -2 -1 +3 Shy— Outgoing
-1 - 2 + 1  U 0 -2 -1 +2 +1 -1 Dishonest— Honest
Subtracting the second set of ratings from the first 
set of ratings results in the following set of difference 
scores: +2 -1 -1 +2 -1 +1 +1 -4 -2 +4
Discontinuing the sign results in the following set 
of values: 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 4 2 4
Comparing each value against every other value, scor­
ing one point for each equivalent pair, results m  a score 
of 11 (14-3).
Cognitive Structure
In addition to their contribution to the total differ­
entiation score, the 10b separate differentiation scores 
can be used to provide a schematic representation of the 
respondent's construct system. Differentiation scores 
which are at least plus or minus one standard deviation 
units are ot special interest as each indicates a pair ot 
constructs which are highly related or unrelated, respec­
tively. A graphic representation of these constructs 
would reflect the quality and degree of the structural 
organization maintained by the respondent.
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REP TEST INSTRUCTIONS
A. Select a person from your life who corresponds 
to each of the 10 role categories enumerated below and 
write that person's first mane or initials in the space 
provided for it. Each name should represent a person you 
know well. DO NOT USE THE SAME PERSON FOR MORE THAN ONE 
CATEGORY.
Role Categories
1. Mother or a person who is most like a mother to 
you.
2. Father or a person who is most like a father 
to you.
3. Brother nearest your age. If you do not have
a brother, choose a person who is most like a
brother to you.
4. Sister nearest your age. If you do not have 
a sister, choose a person who is most like a 
sister to you.
5. Husband or wife. If you are not married, choose 
a close friend who is the opposite sex from you.
6. Close friend who is the same sex as you.
7. Person you dislike who was once your close friend.
8. Person who for some reason seems to dislike you.
9. Person who makes you feel uncomfortable.
10. Boss or person who holds a position of authority
over you.
41
B. Select 15 bipolar adjective dimensions from the 
following list (next page). Make your selection on the 
basis Of the STRENGTH AND FREQUENCY WITH WHICH YOU USE 
THESE DIMENSIONS IN DESCRIBING OR THINKING ABOUT THE 
VARIOUS PEOPLE IN YOUR LIFE. Write these adjective dimen­
sions in the 15 spaces provided for them. For example,
if you frequently use the dimension "shy— outgoing 
write SHY in the space associated with the column headed 
by -3, -2, -1 and OUTGOING in the space associated with 
the column headed by +1, +2, +3. Repeat this procedure 
for each of the 15 bipolar adjective dimensions that you 
select.
C. Now that you have completed the task of assigning 
persons and adjective dimensions, consider the first 
adjective dimension and rate each of the 10 persons on 
the basis of the rating scale which ranges from -3 to +3 
including a zero value. Repeat this procedure for each

























24 . rough— gentle
25. conservative— liberal









34 . self-centered— interested in others
35. rude— polite
36 . cautious— daring
37 . irrational— rational




42 . aggressive— mild-mannered
43 . moody— even-tempered
44 . undependable— dependable
45. unfriendly— friendly
46. stingy— generous





52 . boring— interesting
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53. powerless— influential
54. rebellious— obedient
55. unpredictable— predictable
56. excitable— easy-going
57. stubborn— cooperative
58. quiet--talkative
59. apathetic— concerned
60. maladjusted— adjusted
